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INTRODUCTION 
Most people spend a good deal of their adult lives in the work-
place. 1 For many, the workplace is a comfortable atmosphere where 
>I< Lecturer in Law, State University of New York at Buffalo School of Law. I wish 
to thank Professor Michael Gottesman of the Georgetown University Law Center for his 
invaluable comments and support. 
1. In a recent gallup poll of American workers, 84% of those polled said that they 
worked more than 35 hours per week, with a total of 39% saying they worked over 45 hours 
per week, and 12% over 60 hours per week. Job Dissatisfaction Grows: "Moonlighting on 
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they can interact with colleagues and friends. 2 It might be an 
exciting or mundane place, but when job dissatisfaction occurs it is 
generally tied to work related issues such as employee benefits, 
wages, work content, job security, work related stress, or lack of 
mobility.3 For some workers however, the workplace is a place of 
fear and emotional victimization, not based on any job related 
dynamic, but on reactions to their gender, race, color, religion, 
national origin, age, or disability.4 These individuals are forced to 
run a gauntlet of conduct aimed at harassing them based on traits 
beyond their control. It is to this situation that the evolving law of 
workplace harassment addresses. 5 
Because the law regarding workplace harassment is still evolving, 
employees and employers alike face a huge burden with regard to 
proving and defending harassment claims. Employers are often held 
liable under a legal framework that does not clearly delineate their 
the Rise," 312 GALLUP POLL MONTI!. 2, 3 (1991). Additionally, 62% of those surveyed said 
that work "is one of the most important aspects of' their lives. Id. at 4. 
2. Id. (poll showing that four out of five people look forward to going to work). 
3. Id. at 5 (summarizing polls which show that workers are most dissatisfied with 
health insurance, other benefits, chances for promotion, wages, and on the job stress, with 
health benefits and more interesting work topping the list of most desirable job characteris-
tics). Id. at 5-13 (several polls relating to job satisfaction). 
4. Federal law protects each of these classes against discrimination in the terms and 
conditions of employment. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-17, 2000e-2(a)(I) (1988) (race, color, 
gender, religion, and national origin) [Hereinafter "Title VII"]; 42 U.S.c. §§ 12101-12213, 
12112 (Supp. IV. 1992) (disability) [Hereinafter "ADA"]; 29 U.S.c. §§ 621-634, 621(a)(I) 
(1988) (age) [Hereinafter "ADEA"]. Additionally, most states have enacted statutes that 
protect all or some of the classes protected under federal anti-discrimination laws. See, e.g., 
California Fair Employment and Housing Act, CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12900-12996 (Deering 
1993), amended by CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12940(h)(1) (Deering 1994) (race, religion, color, 
national origin, ancestry, disability, medical condition, marital status, sex, or age); New Jersey 
Law Against Discrimination, N.J. REv. STAT. § 10:5-1-42 (1993) (race, creed, color, national 
origin, ancestry, age, marital status, affectional or sexual orientation, familial status, sex, 
present or former disability, or atypical hereditary cellular blood trait). For a more limited 
state discrimination statute, see ALA. CODE §§ 11-43A-45, 11-43A-I07 (1989 & Supp. 1993) 
(applying only to municipal employment and protecting against discrimination based on race, 
sex, political affiliation, or religion). 
5. See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 367, 370-71 (1993) (upholding 
actionability of sexual harassment regardless of the existence of tangible loss to victims and 
acknowledging applicability ofthe hostile work environment theory to other classes protected 
under Title VII); Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57,64-67 (1986) (same); Henson 
v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 902 (1lth Cir. 1982) (comparing sexual and racial 
harassment, and holding that being forced to "run a gauntlet" of abuse in order to continue 
working is demeaning, disconcerting, and if it reaches the appropriate level, a violation of 
Title VII). 
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duties with regard to harassment, and which sometimes alters those 
duties once they are delineated.6 Likewise, employees who are 
harassed based on membership in a protected class have often been 
denied redress because their rights are not clearly defined.7 Thus, 
both employees and employers would benefit from the development 
of analytical structures for evaluating emerging concepts in the law of 
workplace harassment. 
This paper focuses on an important issue raised by the evolving 
law applicable to workplace harassment -- how the recently recog-
6. In Meritor, the only Supreme Court case to address the standards to be applied 
to employer liability for workplace harassment, the Court failed to set forth a clear rule for 
determining such liability, but rather noted that general agency principles should apply to 
determine employer liability for hostile work environment claims: 
We therefore decline the parties' invitation to issue a definitive rule on employer 
liability, but we do agree with the EEOC that Congress wanted courts to look to 
agency principles for guidance in this area. While such common-law principles 
may not be transferable in all their particulars to Title VII, Congress' decision to 
define "employer" to include any "agent" of an employer, 42 U.S.C.§ 2000e(b), 
surely evinces an intent to place some limits on the acts of employees for which 
employers under Title VII are to be held responsible. 
Meritor,477 U.S. at 72. Prior to Meritor, the EEOC had advocated strict liability for the 
acts of agents and supervisors. See EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 
C.F.R. § 1604.11(c) (1993) (employer is liable regardless of whether the acts complained of 
were authorized or forbidden by the employer, and regardless of whether the employer knew 
or should have known of their occurrence). Since Meritor, the EEOC has altered its position. 
See EEOC: Policy Guidance on Sexual Harassment, 405 Fair Empl. Prac. Man. (BNA) 6681, 
6693-99 (March 19, 1990) (applying agency principles to determine liability for acts of 
agents and supervisors, including whether the employer knew or should have known of the 
occurrences). 
7. See, e.g., Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 
481 U.S. 1041 (1987) (sexual harassment victim who worked in an office where pornograph-
ic pictures were sometimes displayed, and who was subjected to obscene and vulgar 
comments by a supervisory employee who did not supervise her, was denied relief because 
she could not demonstrate the conduct seriously affected her psychological well being); 
Turley v. Union Carbide Corp., 618 F. Supp. 1438, 1441-42 (S.D. W.Va. 1985) (interpreting 
Title VII concepts as applied to West Virginia law, and holding that a harassment victim 
alleging that she was constantly picked on by her foreman could not succeed on her 
harassment claim in the absence of conduct of a purely sexual nature). Significantly, under 
current law, both of these cases would likely have come out differently. In Harris, 114 S. 
Ct. at 370-71, the Supreme Court specifically held that conduct need not seriously affect a 
victim's psychological well being or cause injury to be actionable, and several circuit courts 
of appeals have held that non-sexual, gender based conduct can create or contribute to a 
hostile work environment. See Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1482 (3d 
Cir. 1990); Hall v. Gus Constr. Co., 842 F.2d 1010, 1013-14 (8th Cir. 1988); McKinney v. 
Dole, 765 F.2d 1129, 1137-40 (D.C. Cir. 1985). See infra Parts I and III for a more detailed 
discussion of gender harassment. 
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nized concept of gender harassment should be treated in light of the 
existing concept of sexual harassment. The relationship between 
gender and sexual harassment is unique, because both are based on 
the same statutory mandate,8 yet, as the EEOC recently recognized, 
their underlying natures are different.9 Gender harassment is 
analogous to harassment aimed at other protected classes that are 
characterized by a single immutable trait, such as race or national 
origin,1O while sexual harassment is part of a related, but different, 
Id. 
8. 42 u.s.c.§ 2000e-2(a)(1) (1988) which provides: 
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(I) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to 
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, 
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, 
religion, sex, or national origin. 
Thus, both gender and sexual harassment arise from the same statutory prohibition of 
discrimination in the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, and are based on the 
same protected classification. 
9. See Supplementary Information to EEOC Proposed Guidelines, 58 Fed. Reg. at 
51,266-68, withdrawn 58 Fed. Reg. 51,396-01 (1994) (noting that sexual harassment should 
be treated separately from gender harassment and harassment aimed at other protected classes, 
because sexual harassment raises unique issues about human interaction); See discussion 
infra Parts I and III which discusses the appropriate relationship between gender and sexual 
harassment. The withdrawal of the proposed guidelines does not vitiate the EEOC's 
statement and acknowledgement that sexual harassment is unique and raises issues about 
human interaction not raised by other types of harassment, including gender harassment. 
That statement is also supported by social science data. See infra notes 11-13 and 
accompanying text. Nor does the withdrawal of the proposed guidelines vitiate the 
application of the standards set forth therein to harassment based on race, religion, gender, 
national origin, age, or disability. See EEOC: Enforcement Guidance on Harris v. Forklift 
Systems, 405 Fair Empl. Prac. Man. (BNA) 7165,7170 (March 8, 1994) (noting applicability 
of standard virtually identical to hostile work environment standard set forth in the Proposed 
Guidelines to harassment based on race, religion, gender, national origin, age, and disability). 
A fine line need not be drawn between gender and sexual harassment, as some conduct 
might qualify as both gender and sexual harassment. In this regard, the methods for 
determining the actionability of hostile work environments will help to clarify the nature of 
the harassment. See infra note 30 and accompanying text. Additionally, mixed gen-
der/sexual harassment claims can be appropriately evaluated pursuant to the framework set 
forth infra Part III.D. 
lD. See McKinney, 765 F.2d at 1137-40 (finding gender harassment to be actionable, 
and holding actionable conduct that would not have occurred "but for" the sex of the victim, 
when it is sufficiently severe or pervasive to create a hostile work environment); EEOC 
Proposed Guidelines, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,266, withdrawn 58 Fed. Reg. 51,396-01 (included 
gender with other protected classes that were covered by guidelines which made hostile work 
environments based on membership in those protected classes actionable, but which excluded 
purely sexual harassment from coverage because it is covered under separate guidelines). 
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dynamic. It is aimed at the victim based on the harasser's sexual 
needs and perceptions,11 the interpersonal relationship between the 
victim and the harasser as perceived by the harasser,12 sex role 
Gender harassment is essentially a behavioral manifestation of misogyny, just as racial 
harassment is often a behavioral manifestation of racism. 
11. See Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991) (harassment was based on 
conduct related to the harasser's attraction to the victim, and the hope that he could enter into 
a relationship with her). See also Supplementary Information to EEOC Proposed Guidelines, 
58 Fed. Reg. 51,266-68, withdrawn 58 Fed. Reg. 51,396-401 (sexual harassment should be 
treated separately from gender harassment because sexual harassment raises unique issues 
about human interaction). The idea that sexual harassment is based upon needs and percep-
tions different than other forms of harassment is also demonstrated by sociological and 
psychological research which evaluates the role of sexual attraction in the workplace setting 
or distinguishes sexual harassment from gender harassment. See Susan T. Fiske, Controlling 
Other People: The Impact 0/ Power or Stereotyping, 48 AM. PSYCHOL. 621, 625-26 (1993) 
(discussing the effect of sexual attraction or the expectancy of a romantic relationship on 
evaluations of opposite sex subordinates by supervisors in the context of a study discussing 
the relationship of power and stereotyping); James E. Gruber, A Typology 0/ Personal and 
Environmental Sexual Harassment: Research and Policy Implications/or the 1990's, 26 
SEX ROLES 442, 458 (1992) (in assessing what types of remarks constitute sexual harassment, 
purely gender based remarks should not be considered because "only those [remarks] that are 
sexually based are technically instances of sexual harassment"); L. Fitzgerald and M. Hesson-
McGinnis, The Dimensions o/Sexual Harassment: A Structural Analysis, 35 J. VOC. BEHAV. 
309 (1989) (subjects who were presented with misogynist comments and gender favoritism 
perceived such conduct as distinct from sexual conduct). 
12. Fiske, supra note 11, at 625-26. 
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stereotypes and power roles,13 in addition to the immutable trait of 
the victim's sex.14 
13. See Anne C. Levy, Sexual Harassment Cases in the 1990's: "Backlashing"the 
"Backlash" Through Title VII, 56 ALB. L. REv. 1, 40-49 (1992), which discusses the 
relevance of sex role stereotypes and male perceptions of women in relation to sexual 
harassment, but which characterizes gender and sexual harassment as distinct ramifications 
of the same psychological phenomenon, primarily male power roles which cause males to 
utilize stereotypes, etc. However, power role perceptions alone do not completely account 
for the type of harassment seen in Ellison, where a romantic interest by a male employee 
caused him to terrorize a co-employee who clearly was not interested. As Levy suggests, the 
power role perceptions of those who want to keep or gain power do underlie most forms of 
harassment and discrimination, be it sexual, gender, racial, etc., but in the sexual harassment 
context, the infusion of sexuality is also based on needs, stereotypes, and perceptions of a 
different nature than those involved in other forms of harassment. See Fiske, supra note 11, 
at 621 (discussing the relationship between power and stereotyping in the context of a sexual 
harassment and a sex discrimination case, and noting that power can facilitate stereotyping 
and reactions to it, but the discriminator's personal motivations also playa role, as does his 
or her perception of the victim as a romantic or work related interest). 
In Jenson v. Eveleth Taconite Co., 824 F. Supp. 847 (Minn. 1993), the court addressed 
expert psychological testimony regarding the inherently sexual nature of sexual stereotyping, 
and the results of its occurrence in the workplace, including sexual harassment. Jenson, 824 
F. Supp. at 847. The court relied in part on the testimony of Dr. Eugene Borgida, the 
plaintiff's expert witness, who has done extensive research and written several articles on the 
topic of sexual stereotyping. Dr. Borgida's testimony regarding the nature and effects of 
sexual stereotyping was summarized as follows: 
Sex stereotyping, specifically male sex stereotyping of women, involves the thought 
process whereby "women are perceived in categorical terms, in terms of a 
stereotype of what women are like, how they think and what their attributes are. 
It's a thought process whereby women are considered in generalized terms .... " 
Dr. Borgida concluded that the major effect of sex stereotyping was "sexual 
spillover," which is the idea that "the sexual dimension that characterizes male-
female relationships outside of a work environment spills over ... , and ... 
becomes part of the working environment." Sexual spillover creates a sexualized 
work environment which Dr. Borgida found to be represented by sexual photo-
graphs, cartoons, and jokes, as well as sexual language directed at women. 
Id. at 881 (citations omitted). Additionally, the court discussed the concept of "priming," 
which in the sexual harassment context is tied to sexual material in the workplace. Studies 
evaluating the concept demonstrate that males exposed to sexual materials tend to view 
women as sex objects. /d. at 882-83. The court concluded: "In addition sexual stereotyping 
generally, and "priming" research specifically, provide a framework for understanding why 
consistent and pervasive acts of sexual harassment occur in work environments similar to 
Eveleth Mines." Id. at 883 (citation omitted). Concepts such as "priming" do not discount 
the ideas set forth in the Levy article, rather they acknowledge that in the context of sexual 
harassment, the unique factor of sexuality augments the power role perceptions of the 
dominant group in a given workplace, and results in the manifestation of a type of harassment 
that is not applicable to other protected classes. See Fiske, supra note 11, at 625-26. 
14. Of course, some of these factors are relevant to gender harassment as well, but 
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As a result of this dichotomy, and the differing nature of the 
conduct involved in sexual and gender harassment, the hostile work 
environment cause of action which is applicable to both sexual and 
gender harassment, I 5 will likely apply differently to sexual and 
gender-based claims. Of particular concern is the possibility that 
triers of fact will not find allegations of gender harassment sufficient-
ly severe or pervasive to be actionable because gender harassment 
does not usually involve the type of vulgar, overtly sexual conduct 
generally associated with sexual harassment. 16 In such situations, a 
gender harassment victim might be subject to a level of conduct 
which would support a hostile work environment claim such as that 
based on race or national origin, but would be denied relief because 
that conduct seems mild compared to the public or judicial perception 
of sexual harassment. Significantly, if gender harassment was 
appropriately contextualized with regard to other types of harassment, 
judges would have an appropriate analytical framework to look to in 
evaluating gender harassment claims, and juries could be appropriately 
instructed regarding that framework. Thus, the odd relationship 
between gender and sexual harassment makes the development of 
such an analytical framework, which appropriately contextualizes 
gender harassment claims, essential to protecting the rights of gender 
harassment victims. 
since the line between gender and sexual harassment is not a precise one, it is easiest to 
consider gender harassment as a manifestation of misogyny and sexual harassment as arising 
from a dynamic which mayor may not reflect misogyny, but which always is charged with 
sexuality. Thus, while there might be some overlap between the factors which result in 
gender or sexual harassment, such as power roles, see supra note 13, the dynamic itself is 
different. Additionally, this article does not claim to account for every social or psychologi-
cal factor which contributes to a hostile work environment resulting from sexual or gender 
based conduct. While sexual and gender harassment have been recognized as separate 
phenomena, see supra note 9 and accompanying text, and they are caused, at least in part, 
by different factors, see supra note 11, the purpose of this article is not to create a precise, 
bright line definition of sexual and gender harassment, but rather to call attention to the 
realistic concern that non-sexualized, gender based harassment will be unjustly minimized if 
viewed on a continuum with the often lewd, sexually charged conduct associated with sexual 
harassment. 
15. See Harris, 114 S. Ct. at 370-71 (hostile work environment applicable to sexual 
harassment); McKinney, 765 F.2d at 1129 (hostile work environment applicable to gender 
harassment). 
16. The idea that harassing conduct must be sufficiently severe and pervasive to be 
actionable is central to the hostile work environment cause of action and is discussed in depth 
infra Part I1.A. 
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Part I of this Article discusses the nature of gender harassment, 
and sets forth the proposition that gender harassment has more in 
common with racial, religious, and national origin harassment, than 
it does with sexual harassment. It also delineates three hypotheticals 
which are utilized in Part III to demonstrate the unfair consequences 
that could result from analyzing gender harassment claims in the 
wrong context. 
Part II discusses the history, basis, and structure of the hostile 
work environment cause of action, which is the cause of action 
applicable to gender harassment under Title VII.17 It also discusses 
quid pro quo harassment which is relevant in the sexual harassment 
context,18 but not to gender harassment. 19 
Part III provides a context for gender harassment claims and sets 
forth an analytical framework to be applied to such claims. The 
potential results of analyzing gender harassment claims in relation to 
sexual harassment is discussed, and it is argued that the appropriate 
context for analyzing gender harassment claims is provided by racial, 
religious, and national origin harassment. This is demonstrated by 
looking at cases that have upheld claims for sexual, gender, racial, 
religious, and national origin harassment, and by an analysis of the 
hypotheticals set forth in Part I. Finally, a method is delineated for 
analyzing mixed gender/sexual harassment claims in light of their 
differing contexts. 
17. See Harris, 114 S. Ct. at 367 (noting applicability of hostile work environment 
to classes protected under Title VII); McKinney, 765 F.2d at 1129 (applying hostile work 
environment cause of action to gender harassment claim); Delgado v. Lehman, 665 F. Supp. 
460 (E.D. Va. 1987). 
18. See EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 
(applying both hostile work environment and quid pro quo concepts to sexual harassment); 
Kauffman v. Allied Signal, Inc., 970 F.2d 178, 185-86 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 831 
(1992) (applying quid pro quo harassment theory). 
19. See discussion infra Part II.B. 
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1. UNDERSTANDING GENDER HARASSMENT 
Title VII provides: 
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to 
discriminate against any individual with respectto his compensation, terms, 
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, 
color, religion, sex, or national origin .... 20 
861 
Workplace harassment violates Title VII's prohibition of discrimi-
nation in the terms and conditions of employment when it is aimed at 
an employee, or group of employees, based on membership in a 
protected class.21 Sex is specifically delineated as a protected 
class.22 Thus, harassment aimed at an employee because of his or 
her sex is actionable under Title VII. 
Such harassment can take the form of overt sexual conduct, but 
conduct need not be overtly sexual to violate Title VII so long as it 
is aimed at an employee because of his or her sex.23 The latter type 
of conduct, which in recent years has been termed "gender harass-
ment,,,24 is essentially the same as harassment based on race/5 
religion,26 and national origin/7 because it is aimed at an individu-
al, or individuals, solely because of a negative perception of the 
victim's class.28 The former, which is considered to be "sexual 
20. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (1988). 
21. Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986). 
22. See supra note 20, and accompanying text. . 
23. McKinney v. Dole, 765 F.2d 1129, 1137-40 (D.C. Cir. 1985). 
24. See Joseph M. Pellicciotti, Sexual Harassment in the Workplace: A Consideration 
of Post- Vinson Approaches Designed to Determine Whether Sexual Harassment is Sufficiently 
Severe or Pervasive, 5 DEPAUL Bus. L.J. 215, 226-28 (1993) (recognizing the emergence 
of gender harassment). 
25. See EEOC Proposed Guidelines, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,266 (1993), withdrawn 58 Fed. 
Reg. 51,396-01 (same standards applicable to workplace harassment based on race and 
gender). 
26. [d. 
27. [d. 
28. Compare Delgado v. Lehman, 665 F. Supp. 460,463-68 (E.D. Va. 1987) (holding 
that harassing conduct not specifically relating to gender stereotypes, and negative comments 
which were aimed at female employees, could create a hostile work environment based on 
gender) with Boutros v. Canton Regional Transit Auth., 997 F.2d 198 (6th Cir. 1993) (der-
ogatory conduct and conduct that caused an Arab employee to be unnecessarily disciplined 
because of his national origin, contributed to a hostile work environment based on national 
origin); Vance v. Southern Bell Tel. and Tel. Co., 863 F.2d 1503,1510-11 (lith Cir. 1989), 
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harassment,"29 is similar to other types of harassment, but has some 
aspects that are uniquely tied to the sexual nature of the conduct. 30 
Individual instances of harassing conduct need not be categorized as 
either sexual or gender harassment because, as will be discussed in the 
next section of this paper, it is the totality of conduct that determines 
whether harassment is actionable under Title VII.3) In this regard, 
there will likely be cases where the allegations could support both 
sexual and gender harassment claims. 32 
In evaluating claims of "gender harassment," it is essential to 
analyze them in the same way as racial, religious, and national origin 
cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1110 (1995) (holding that incidents involving the hanging of a noose 
over an African American employee's desk, unwarranted discipline, transporting the 
employee to the wrong place, and racial discrimina,tion aimed at other employees, can 
contribute to a hostile work environment); Compston v. Borden, Inc., 424 F. Supp. 157 (S.D. 
Ohio 1976) (work related harassment due to an employee's religious affiliation, and religious 
slurs, can contribute to actionable religious based harassment in violation of Title VII, 
although the court did not specifically apply the hostile work environment structure). 
29. See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 57 (noting actionability of overtly sexual conduct as 
sexual harassment); EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. 
§ 1604.11 (adopting standards for "sexual haraSsment"). 
30. See Supplementary Information to EEOC Proposed Guidelines, 58 Fed. Reg. 
51,267 (1993), withdrawn 58 Fed. Reg. 51,396-01 (1993) (treating sexual harassment in 
different guidelines than other forms of harassment because it involves unique issues about 
human interaction). See also supra notes 11-13 (discussing psychological aspects of gender 
and sexual harassment). 
31. As will be discussed in Part II., the primary cause of action for workplace 
harassment under Title VII is "hostile work environment," which is evaluated based on the 
severity and pervasiveness of alleged conduct, and generally requires more than one 
discriminatory incident. Harris v. Forklift Sys. Inc., 114 S. Ct. 367, 370 (1993) (noting that 
a single racial epithet is insufficient to create a hostile work environment). It is possible that 
a single extremely harsh incident could create a hostile work environment. However, the 
conduct involved would have to be especially egregious. See Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 
878 (9th Cir. 1991) (noting that the required showing of severity or seriousness of the 
harassing conduct varies inversely with the pervasiveness or frequency of the conduct); King 
v. Board of Regents, 898 F.2d 533,537 (7th Cir. 1990) (one incident can be enough to create 
a hostile work environment, but repeated incidents are generally necessary to create a strong 
hostile work environment claim). As noted above, however, a single slur is clearly 
insufficient to establish a hostile work environment claim. Harris, 114 S. Ct. at 370. In 
addition to hostile work environment, quid pro quo harassment, which requires the linking 
of employment or an emolument of employment to sexual favors, has been recognized under 
Title VII, but only in regard to sexual harassment. See, e.g., Kauffman v. Allied Signal, Inc., 
970 F.2d 178 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 831 (1992) (discussing quid pro quo 
harassment). Because of the overtly sexual nature of quid pro quo harassment, it will not be 
categorized as gender harassment, and thus is irrelevant to this part of the discussion. 
32. Such cases are discussed infra Part III.D. It is suggested that they should 
generally be treated like mixed racial/sexual harassment cases. 
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harassment. However, there is a risk that gender harassment claims 
will not be appropriately evaluated because they might be compared 
to sexual harassment. This could cause a trier of fact to minimize 
gender harassment claims by analyzing them in light of the often lewd 
or shocking allegations involved in sexual harassment cases.33 To 
understand the appropriate context and treatment of gender harassment 
claims in light of sexual harassment and harassment aimed at other 
protected classes, it is helpful to consider the following three 
hypotheticals. 
1. Ms. R is a clerical worker in a police department. From her 
first day at work she was subjected to overtly sexual comments such 
as, "Hey baby, you have a great body," and "Come sit on my lap and 
feel my nightstick." She was frequently pinched on the buttocks by 
the sergeant in charge of her work station. One day, when she was 
bending over to do some filing, he walked up behind her and pressed 
his genitals against her, and said, "Let's go in the back and fool 
around." Ms. R replied, "No! I'm not interested, I have a boy-
friend," and ran out of the room. A few days later, pornographic 
magazines were left on her chair depicting explicit acts with an 
unsigned note attached saying, "My place at nine." Later that day, 
her supervisor cornered her in a small office, grabbed her breast, and 
tried to reach up her skirt. She escaped before he could. Since then, 
her supervisor and co-workers have left vibrators and other sex toys 
on her desk, and the conduct continues to occur. Other women in the 
office are not subjected to the same type of conduct, but have been 
present when Ms. R was so subjected. 
2. Ms. T is a government employee who processes documents for 
an agency. She is the only female employee in a small department. 
From her first day at work, her supervisor told her regularly, "Women 
don't belong in the workplace, why don't you go home and have 
33. One of the most stunning examples of a sexually hostile work environment is 
provided by the facts underlying the Meritor case. The plaintiff in that case alleged that her 
supervisor engaged in sexual intercourse with her, made repeated demands for sexual favors, 
fondled her in front of other employees, followed her into the ladies' restroom, exposed 
himself to her, and forcibly raped her. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 60-61. However, conduct need 
not be so egregious to constitute sexual harassment. In Harris, the Court addressed the 
egregiousness of the conduct alleged in Meritor, and held that conduct need not be so 
appalling to be actionable: "the appalling conduct alleged in Meritor, and the reference in 
that case to environments 'so heavily polluted with discrimination as to destroy completely 
the emotional and psychological stability of minority workers,' merely present some 
especially egregious examples of harassment. They do not mark the boundary of what is 
actionable." Harris, 114 S. Ct. at 371 (citations omitted). 
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some kids?" He also yelled at her more than the male employees and 
hid documents which would help her to do her job. On several 
occasions he said, "Women are only good for looking at and bearing 
children, and I only like looking at them if they have big breasts, 
which you don't." No adverse employment action, such as demotion 
or termination was taken against Ms. T, but she overheard her 
supervisor tell another employee, "I wish I could get rid of that damn 
woman, they have no place in a man's office." The conduct and 
remarks continue to occur. 
3. Mr. H is an African-American equipment serviceman working 
for a telecommunications company. His boss and co-workers 
regularly refer to him as "little sambo," and say that he sho"l-Ild "go 
back to pickin' cotton where he belongs." They regularly hide his 
equipment and take reports from his desk. His supervisor gives him 
orders which violate company policy, and then disciplines him for 
following those orders. On one occasion, an advertisement for a Ku 
Klux Klan rally was left on his chair, and the next day a note saying, 
"Missed you at the rally, sure could have had fun if you came." The 
conduct and comments continue to occur. 
As we explore the law relating to workplace harassment, and 
analyze the emerging concept of gender harassment, keep these 
hypotheticals in mind. They will be discussed further in Part III. 
II. CAUSES OF ACTION FOR WORKPLACE HARASSMENT 
RECOGNIZED UNDER TITLE VII 
A. Hostile Work Environment 
Understanding the structure for hostile work environment claims 
is essential to analyzing the emerging concept of gender harassment. 
This is because the application of that structure to gender harassment 
will have a substantial impact on the ability of gender harassment 
victims to obtain redress. Since the application of the hostile work 
environment cause of action can have such profound effects on gender 
harassment claims, hostile work environment must be understood in 
light of its statutory and historical bases in order to appropriately 
apply it to gender harassment claims. 
Hostile work environment is a cause of action unique to anti-
discrimination law. It was initially recognized by the Fifth Circuit 
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Court of Appeals in Rogers v. EEOC,34 a 1971 case brought under 
Title VII involving race discrimination aimed at a Hispanic employee. 
The Supreme Court addressed the issue of workplace harassment 
for the first time in 1986 in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson,35 a case 
involving sexual harassment. In Meritor, the Supreme Court set forth 
a general standard to be applied to hostile work environment 
claims.36 The Court held that a sexually hostile work environment 
exists when an employee is subjected to, because of his or her sex, 
unwelcome conduct which is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter 
the conditions of employment and create an abusive working 
environment. 37 The Court also held that Title VII's protection is not 
limited to pecuniary interests.38 
After Meritor, courts disagreed over the application of the general 
framework set forth by the Supreme COurt.39 Divergent views 
34. 454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957 (1972). 
35. 477 U.S. 57 (1986). 
36. The Meritor Court acknowledged, but did not discuss, quid pro quo sexual 
harassment. Meritor,477 U.S. at 65. Despite the fact that the case involved only sexual 
harassment, the Court acknowledged and approved of lower court decisions which held that 
harassment aimed at other classes protected under Title VII can be actionable. Id. at 66. 
37. Id. at 66-68. Although Meritor dealt with a sexually hostile work environment, 
the Court implied that the standards set forth therein are equally applicable to anyone 
protected under Title VII. Id. at 66. 
38. Id. at 64. In response to the petitioner's argument that Title VII only protects 
against "tangible loss" of an "economic character," and not "purely psychological aspects of 
the workplace environment," the Meritor Court held: "the language of Title VII is not 
limited to 'economic' or 'tangible' discrimination. The phrase 'terms, conditions, or 
privileges of employment' evinces a Congressional intent 'to strike at the entire spectrum of 
disparate treatment of men and women' in employment." Jd. 
39. Several cases dealing with sexual harassment illustrate the variety of interpreta-
tions given the Meritor framework. See Burns v. McGregor Elec. Indus., Inc., 955 F.2d 
559, 564 n.3 (8th Cir. 1992) (a hostile work environment exists when the complainant can 
show that she belongs to a protected class, was subjected to unwelcome harassment, the 
harassment was based on sex [but need not be clearly sexual in nature], the harassment 
affected a term, condition, or privilege of employment, and the employer knew or should 
have known of the harassment, and failed to take appropriate remedial action); Ellison v. 
Brady, 924 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991) (a hostile work ~nvironment exists where an employee 
is subject to unwelcome conduct of a sexual nature which a reasonable woman would 
consider sufficiently severe and pervasive to alter the conditions of employment and create 
a hostile or abusive working environment); Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469 
(3d Cir. 1990) (a hostile work environment claim can be successful when the employee can 
show that he or she suffered intentional discrimination because of sex, the discrimination was 
pervasive and regular, the discrimination detrimentally affected the plaintiff, the discrimina-
tion would have detrimentally affected a reasonable person of the same sex in that position, 
and as to employers, the existence of respondeat superior liability); Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. 
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emerged regarding the appropriate objective reasonableness standard-
- the standard under which the severity or pervasiveness of the 
conduct is evaluated;40 whether the victim must demonstrate that the 
harassment seriously affected his or her psychological well-being or 
led the victim to suffer injury;41 and whether a harassment victim 
must demonstrate he or she subjectively perceived the work environ-
ment to be hostile.42 The confusion over these issues meant that 
employers and employees could not know the full extent of their 
rights and duties, and that particular conduct could be actionable in 
one circuit, but not in others. 
In an attempt to clarify some of these issues, the Supreme Court 
again addressed the issue of workplace harassment in Harris v. 
Forklift Systems, Inc. 43 The Court granted certiorari to determine 
whether injury to a victim's psychological well-being is necessary for 
harassment to be actionable.44 The Court held that such injury was 
not necessary for harassment to be actionable.45 In addition, the 
Court addressed the objective and subjective reasonableness ques-
Co., 805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987)(to prevail on sexually 
offensive work environment claim an employee must prove she was a member of a protected 
class, was subject to unwelcome sexual harassment in the form of sexual advances, requests 
for sexual favors, or other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature which had the effect 
of unreasonably interfering with her work performance, and created an intimidating, hostile 
or offensive work environment that affected seriously her physical well-being and, as to 
employer liability, the existence of respondeat superior liability). 
40. See Ellison, 924 F.2d at 872 (severity and pervasiveness should be evaluated 
from the perspective of a reasonable woman); Andrews, 895 F.2d at 1469 (severity and 
pervasiveness should be evaluated from the perspective of a reasonable person of the same 
sex as the victim); Rabidue, 805 F.2d at 611 (severity and pervasiveness should be evaluated 
from the perspective of a reasonable person). 
41. See Ellison, 924 F.2d at 877-78 (no requirement that the victim show serious 
effect on psychological well being); Rabidue, 805 F.2d at 620 (requiring such showing); 
Vance·v. Southern Bell Tel. and Tel. Co., 863 F.2d at 1503 (11th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 
115 S. Ct. 1110 (1995). The term "suffer injury" most likely refers to physical manifesta-
tions of psychological injury or actual physical harm caused by an act of harassment. 
Otherwise there would be no need to refer to it separately from the term "seriously affect 
psychological well being." This interpretation is consistent with the tort of intentional 
infliction of emotional distress, which also requires emotional harm, and recognizes that 
bodily injury can result from such harm. RESTA lEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46( 1) (1965). 
42. See Ellison, 924 F.2d at 872 (no subjective prong required, although the issue of 
whether victim welcomed the conduct should be considered); but see Andrews, 895 F.2d at 
1469 (subjective prong must be considered). 
43. 114 S. Ct. 367 (1993). 
44. HarriS, 114 S. Ct. at 370. 
45. Id. at 370-71. 
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tions,46 holding that the severity or pervasiveness of harassing 
conduct should be evaluated under a reasonable person standard, and 
that a victim of workplace harassment must also subjectively perceive 
the working environment as abusive.47 Significantly, in regard to the 
objective reasonableness standard, the Court may have created more 
questions than it answered.48 
The Court held that conduct is sufficiently severe or pervasive to 
create an objectively hostile work environment when a reasonable 
person would find the working environment to be hostile or abu-
sive.49 However, the meaning of "reasonable person" under this 
standard is unclear. In this regard, the Court attempted to provide 
some guidance. 
First, the Court noted that its test for hostile work environment 
cannot, by its nature, be mathematically precise. 50 Thus, the Court 
implicitly acknowledged that given the nature of hostile work 
environment claims, there must be some flexibility in the structure 
applied to those claims to account for the wide variety of situations 
which the courts will face. Such flexibility could include consider-
ation of the perspective of a reasonable member of the victim's 
protected class. Second, the Court held that "whether an environment 
is 'hostile' or 'abusive' can be determined only by looking at all the 
circumstances.,,51 Such circumstances may include the severity and 
frequency of the conduct alleged, whether it involves physical threats 
or humiliation as opposed to a mere offensive utterance, and whether 
it "unreasonably interferes with" the victim's work performance. 52 
The Court's mandate to consider the totality of the circumstances in 
a hostile work environment case reinforces the flexibility of the 
46. ld. 
47. ld. 
48. See Frank S. Ravitch, Beyond Reasonable Accommodation: The Availability and 
Structure of a Cause of Action for Workplace Harassment Under the Americans With 
Disabilities Act, 15 CARDOZO L. REv. 1475, 1478-79 n.21, 1480 n.24, 1483 n.37 (the Court 
set forth a reasonable person standard, but implied in dicta that it could mean reasonable 
person of the alleged victim's class, and expressly refused to address the EEOC proposed 
guidelines applicable to non-sexual harassment which apply a different standard). 
49. Harris, 114 S. Ct. at 370. In Harris, the Court stated, "conduct that is not severe 
or pervasive enough to create an objectively hostile or abusive work environment-an 
environment that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive-is beyond Title VII's 
purview." Id. 
50. ld. at 371. 
51. ld. 
52. ld. 
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hostile work environment standard and lends support to the position 
that the perspective of the victim may indeed be an important factor 
to consider among all of the circumstances. 53 
Finally, the Court expressly refused to consider the EEOC 
Proposed Guidelines on Harassment Based on Race, Color, Religion, 
Gender, National Origin, Age, or Disability, which were issued in 
October 1993/4 and noted, "we need not answer today all the 
potential questions it [the Court's test] raises.,,55 The Court's refusal 
to consider the proposed guidelines is significant because the proposed 
guidelines applied a reasonable person under the same or similar 
circumstances standard, which included consideration of the perspec-
tive of members of the alleged victim's protected class. 56 By 
refusing to consider the EEOC Proposed Guidelines despite the 
objective reasonableness standard they proposed, the Court left open 
the possibility that it would support an interpretation of the "reason-
able person" standard which means reasonable woman when the 
53. See Ellison, 924 F.2d at 878-81 (adopting the victim's perspective, because 
otherwise the standard applied might simply reinforce the "prevailing level of discrimination," 
and because certain classes have different life experiences and thus different perspectives on 
harassing conduct). 
54. See supra note 9 (for a discussion of EEOC guidelines). These guidelines were 
withdrawn in 58 Fed. Reg. 51,396-0 I (1993). However, that withdrawal does not affect the 
relevance of the Harris Court's refusal to address those guidelines since the guidelines were 
not withdrawn because the standards they proposed were invalid. The Harris Court's refusal 
to consider the objective reasonableness standard that the proposed guidelines set forth, which 
included consideration of the victim's perspective, demonstrates the Court was not willing 
to preclude such an interpretation of the reasonable person standard it had set forth. This is 
further supported by the fact that in Steiner v. Showboat Operating Co., a post Harris case, 
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals applied a reasonable woman standard in a sexual 
harassment case. Steiner v. Showboat Operating Co., 25 F.3d 1459, 1462-64 (9th Cir. 1994), 
cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 733 (1995). EEOC interpretive guidance on the Harris case likewise 
supports the application of a standard which includes consideration of the victim's 
perspective. EEOC: Enforcement Guidance on Harris V. Forklift Systems, 405 Fair Empl. 
Prac. Man. (BNA) 7165 (March 8, 1994). 
55. Harris, 114 S. Ct. at 371. 
56. The EEOC Proposed Guidelines state: 
The standard for determining whether verbal or physical conduct relating to race, 
color, religion, gender, national origin, age, or disability is sufficiently severe or 
pervasive to create a hostile or abusive working environment is whether a 
reasonable person in the same or similar circumstances would find the conduct 
intimidating, hostile, or abusive. The "reasonable person" standard includes 
consideration of the perspective of persons of the alleged victim's race, color, 
religion, gender, national origin, age, or disability. It is not necessary to make an 
additional showing of psychological harm. 
58 Fed. Reg. 51,269 (1993), withdrawn 58 Fed. Reg. 51,396-01 (1993). 
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victim is female, reasonable African-American, when the victim is 
black, etc. 57 
Significantly, the EEOC recently issued interpretive guidance 
regarding Harris, and its effect on the EEOC guidelines applicable to 
sexual harassment.58 That guidance takes the position that the 
reasonable person standard set forth in Harris does allow for 
consideration of the perspectives of members of the victim's class.59 
The EEOC's position in this regard is consistent with the language of 
Harris as discussed in this Part. 
Consideration of the victim's perspective is essential to carrying 
out the purposes of Title VII, because a strict reasonable person 
standard could lead to the perpetuation of the prevailing level of 
discriminatory attitudes and conduct in the workplace.60 It is quite 
likely that, in the context of both sexual and gender harassment, many 
courts will continue to apply a standard which acknowledges the 
victim's perspective. In fact, the Ninth Circuit has already done so 
in a post Harris case.61 In light of the concerns raised in Part III of 
this article, it is particularly important that the victim's perspective be 
applied in gender harassment cases. 
In addition to the recent developments involving the test applied 
to hostile work environment claims, there have been some develop-
57. But see Ravitch, supra note 48, at 1505-09 (proposing the even more focused 
"reasonable person with the same disability" standard in the disability context, as opposed to 
"reasonable person with a disability," to account for the variety of perceptions attendant to 
the different disabilities covered under the ADA). 
58. See EEOC Enforcement Guidance on Harris v. Forklift Systems, 405 Fair Empl. 
Prac. Man. (BNA) 7165 (March 8, 1994) (discussing Harris and noting it is consistent with 
the EEOC Guidelines dealing with sexual harassment as augmented by EEOC Policy 
Guidance). 
59. Id. at 7168-70. 
60. In Ellison, the court noted, "harassers could continue to harass merely because 
a particular discriminatory practice [is] common, and victims of harassment would have no 
remedy." Ellison, 924 F.2d at 878. This rationale has also been used in EEOC policy 
guidelines regarding sexual harassment to support the conclusion that the reasonable person 
standard set forth by the EEOC, and by the Supreme Court in Harris, allows for consider-
ation of the perspective of members of the alleged victim's class. See EEOC: Policy 
Guidance on Sexual Harassment, 405 Fair Empl. Prac. Man. (BNA) at 6690 (noting that the 
reasonable person standard should include consideration of the victim's perspective "and not 
stereotyped notions of acceptable behavior"); EEOC Enforcement Guidance on Harris v. 
Forklift Systems, 405 Fair Empl. Prac. Man. (BNA) at 7168-69 (approving of the EEOC 
policy guidance interpretation ofthe reasonable person standard, and stating that the standard 
set forth in Harris is consistent with that interpretation). 
61. See Steiner, 25 F.3d at 1462-64. 
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ments over the last few years relevant to the dichotomy between 
gender and sexual harassment.· As discussed above,62 the EEOC 
issued proposed guidelines dealing with harassment based on race, 
color, religion, gender, national origin, age, and disability in October 
of 1993. While those guidelines have since been withdrawn,63 the 
principles undedying them are still significant in the gender harass-
ment context. For example, the proposed guidelines applied to gender 
harassment, but did not supersede the guidelines applicable to sexual 
harassment. 64 Therefore, the EEOC apparently recognized a dichoto-
my between gender and sexual harassment, as it applied different 
guidelines, and, to some extent, different standards to gender and 
sexual harassment.65 In fact, in the supplementary information to the 
EEOC Proposed Guidelines, the EEOC states that sexual harassment 
raises unique issues about human interaction, and thus "may warrant 
separate emphasis. ,,66 The proposed guidelines were withdrawn 
under circumstances which do not affect the viability of this statement 
or the EEOC's decision to keep the sexual harassment guidelines 
similar to, but separate from, the proposed guidelines.67 
Prior to the issuance of the EEOC Proposed Guidelines, courts had 
increasingly begun to recognize the actionability of non-sexual, 
gender-based conduct.68 Several courts, including at least three 
federal courts of appeal, have recognized the actionability of such 
conduct.69 While it is true that a few courts have held that conduct 
must be of a sexual nature to be actionable,70 in light of the number 
62. See supra note 54 and accompanying text. 
63. See supra notes 9 and 54. 
64. Supplementary Information to EEOC Proposed Guidelines, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,267, 
withdrawn 58 Fed. Reg. 51,396-01. 
65. See infra Parts II.A. and III (for the dichotomy between sexual and gender 
harassment and the treatment of those forms of harassment by the courts and the EEOC). 
66. Supplementary Information to EEOC Proposed Guidelines, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,267, 
withdrawn 58 Fed. Reg. 51,396-01. 
67. See supra notes 9 and 54. 
68. See, e.g., Andrews, 895 F.2d at 1482, 1485 (case involving both sexual and non-
sexual conduct aimed at women which acknowledged that gender based harassment is 
actionable). See also Hall v. Gus Constr. Co., 842 F.2d 1010, 1013-14 (8th Cir. 1988); 
McKinney v. Dole, 765 F.2d 1129, 1137-40 (D.C. Cir. 1985). 
69. Andrews, 895 F.2d at 1482; Hall, 842 F.2d at 1013-14; McKinney, 765 F.2d at 
1137-40. 
70. See, e.g., Jones v. Flagship, Int'!, 793 F.2d 714, 720 n.5 (5th Cir. 1986), cert. 
denied, 479 U.S. 1065 (1987) (indicating that to be actionable, conduct must be of a sexual 
nature); Downes v. Federal Aviation Admin., 775 F.2d 288, 290 (Fed. Cir. 1985); Turley v. 
Union Carbide Corp., 618 F. Supp. 1438, 1441-42 (S.D. W.Va. 1985). 
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of recent appellate court opinions recognizing the actionability of non-
sexual gender-based harassment,7l that position no longer seems 
viable. 
B. Quid Pro Quo 
Quid pro quo harassment is a distinct theory from hostile work 
environment. Unlike hostile work environment which can be applied 
in several contexts, such as race, color, gender, religion, national 
origin, age, and disability,72 quid pro quo is only applicable to sexual 
harassment. This is due to the nature of the cause of action, which 
requires the conditioning of employment, or the emoluments of 
employment, on sexual favors. 73 
To set forth an actionable claim under the quid pro quo cause of 
action, the victim must demonstrate: (1) that he or she is a member 
of a protected class; (2) he or she was subjected to unwelcome 
harassment in the form of sexual advances or requests for sexual 
favors; (3) that the harassment was based on sex; and (4) that 
submission to the unwelcome advances was an express or implied 
condition for the receipt of job benefits, or that refusal to submit to 
the sexual demands resulted in a tangible job detriment.74 The 
Supreme Court recognized the quid pro quo cause of action, without 
addressing its structure, in Meritor. 75 
In the absence of explicit sexual demands or advances, quid pro 
quo is inapplicable. It is the conditioning of job benefits or detri-
ments on the provision of sexual favors or submission to sexual 
advances that creates the quid pro quO. 76 Thus, the quid pro quo 
harassment cause of action is inapplicable in the gender harassment 
71. See supra notes 9 and 54. 
72. See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 66 (indicating applicability of hostile work environment 
cause of action to classes protected under Title VII). See also Harris, 114 S. Ct. at 371; 
Ravitch, supra note 48 (hostile work environment cause of action is applicable to disability); 
EEOC: Enforcement Guidance on Harris v. Forklift Systems, 405 Fair Empl. Prac. Man. 
(BNA) at 7170 (hostile work environment cause of action is applicable to race, gender, 
religion, national origin, age and disability). 
73. Kauffman v. Allied Signal, Inc., 970 F.2d 178, 185-86 (6th Cir.) cert. denied, 113 
S. Ct. 831 (1992). 
74. Kauffman, 970 F.2d at 186. 
75. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65 (noting that sexual misconduct can be actionable whether 
or not it is linked to an economic quid pro quo, thus acknowledging both hostile work 
environment and quid pro quo). 
76. Kallffman, 970 F.2d at 185-86. 
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context, because it requires overtly sexual conduct, and as a result, 
can only be cognizable as a form of sexual harassment.77 Therefore, 
hostile work environment is the only cause of action currently 
available under Title VII in regard to the theory of gender harass-
ment.78 
III. ANALYZING GENDER HARASSMENT CLAIMS 
A. Placing Gender Harassment in the Appropriate Context 
In evaluating gender harassment claims there is a risk triers of fact 
will automatically analyze the severity and pervasiveness of the 
allegations by consciously or unconsciously comparing them to sexual 
harassment claims, which generally involve incidents of overtly sexual 
conduct that would be considered lewd or shocking.79 Significantly, 
psychological evidence shows that when people evaluate examples of 
non-sexual, gender-based harassment along with examples of sexual 
harassment, the sexual harassment incidents are viewed as more 
severe. 80 Thus, gender harassment claims would not likely be 
77. ld. 
78. Compare Delgado v. Lehman, 665 F. Supp. 460 (E.D. Va. 1987) (purely gender 
harassment case applying hostile work environment, but not quid pro quo cause of action) 
and EEOC Proposed Guidelines, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,266, withdrawn 58 Fed. Reg. 51,396-01 
(which applied to gender harassment, and did not include any reference to quid pro quo type 
harassment) with EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. § 
1604.11 (a)(2) (describing quid pro quo type harassment in the definition of actionable sexual 
harassment under Title VII). 
79. Of course, individual incidents of gender harassment can also be lewd or 
shocking, but it is the totality of the conduct which determines the actionability of claims for 
workplace harassment. See supra note 31, and accompanying text. In the sexual harassment 
context, the whole pattern of alleged conduct tends to be lewd or shocking. See infra Part 
III.B.1. In the gender harassment context, the totality of the conduct alleged is more likely 
to evince misogynist or misandrynist attitudes, and less likely to demonstrate repeated acts 
of VUlgarity. See infra Part III.B.2. 
80. Social psychology research has demonstrated this phenomenon in evaluators' 
perceptions of incidents that could be characterized as sexual or gender harassment. The 
results of research into the perceptions of those evaluating incidents of sexual harassment 
were tested by David E. Terpstra & Douglas D. Baker, A Hierarchy of Sexual Harassment, 
121 J. PSYCHOL. 599 (1987). Male and female college students, along with working women, 
were exposed to a variety of scenarios which depicted eighteen categories of sexual 
harassment behaviors, and were asked to determine whether each category constituted sexual 
harassment. The results demonstrated that sexual propositions, touchings, and sexual remarks 
were the behaviors the largest number of evaluators considered to be sexual harassment, 
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appropriately redressed if they were analyzed on a continuum with 
sexual harassment. 
However, it would distort Congress' mandate as expressed in Title 
VII, and the Supreme Court's interpretation of that mandate in regard 
to hostile work environment as set forth in Meritor Savings Bank v. 
Vinson,81 and Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 82 to minimize or 
deny redress in hostile work environment claims based on non-sexual 
conduct which interferes with a term or condition of employment, 
simply because the conduct alleged was not as shocking or lewd as 
overtly sexual conduct. To do so would deny to victims of gender 
harassment a right which is available to all other classes protected 
under Title VII, simply because their class can also be subjected to 
sexual harassment. 
Moreover, sexual harassment is not the only possible analogue for 
gender harassment claims. Racial, religious, and national origin 
harassment have also been recognized under Title VII. 83 In these 
contexts, overtly sexual conduct is not required. Rather, such claims 
are generally based on hateful conduct that occurs because of an 
employee's membership in a protected class. 84 Likewise, the key to 
a gender harassment claim is that the conduct alleged would not have 
occurred but for the victim's sex.85 These claims are basically the 
while gender related conduct such as "coarse language" and gestures not directed at a female 
subject, were among the behaviors least likely to be considered sexual harassment. Id. at 
602-04. See also Tricia S. Jones & Martin S. Rumland, Survey 0/ Variability and 
Perceptions 0/ and Responses to Sexual Harassment, 27 SEX ROLES 121, 123-24 (1992) 
(noting that behavior evaluated as severe will be perceived as more harassing than behavior 
not so perceived and that severity is often defined by the explicitness of the conduct or a 
tangible job related cost). Some case law also supports this concern. See Turley v. Union 
Carbide Co., 618 F. Supp. 1438 (S.D. W.Va. 1985) (holding that non-sexual conduct cannot 
contribute to a hostile work environment based on sex). 
81. 477 U.S. 57 (1986). 
82. 114 S. Ct. 367 (1993). 
83. See Boutros v. Canton Regional Transit Auth., 997 F.2d 198 (6th Cir. 1993) 
(harassment aimed at an individual because of his national origin can be actionable under 
Title VII and § 1983); Vance v. Southern Bell Tel. and Tel. Co., 863 F.2d 1503 (11th Cir. 
1989), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1110 (1995) (instances of racial harassment can contribute to 
a racially hostile work environment in violation of Title VII); Turner v. Barr, 811 F. Supp. 
1 (D.D.C. 1993) (harassment aimed at an individual because of his religion and race created 
a hostile work environment based on religion and race). 
84. Boutros, 997 F.2d at 201. 
85. See, e.g., McKinney v. Dole, 765 F.2d 1129 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Campbell v. Board 
of Regents, 770 F. Supp. 1479, 1485-86 (D. Kan. 1991); Delgado v. Lehman, 665 F. Supp. 
460 (E.D. Va. 1987). See also Meritor, 477 U.S. at 64 ("[w]ithout question, when a 
supervisor sexually harasses a subordinate because of the subordinate's sex, that supervisor 
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result of misogyny or misandrony in the workplace, and the severity 
or pervasiveness of such conduct should be evaluated like conduct 
occurring in a workplace charged with racism or anti-semitism. 
Whether based on racism or misogynist and misandrynist attitudes, the 
underlying cause. of actionable non-sexual harassment is dislike or 
disapproval of an individual on the basis of his or her membership in 
a protected class, and the goal of the harassment is not to satisfy 
sexual needs or relieve sexual tension, but to hurt or get rid of an 
employee because he or she is perceived as an outsider. 86 
Thus, the need to compare gender harassment to non-sexual 
harassment does not arise from any significant difference in the 
structure of the hostile work environment cause of action in the -sexual 
and non-sexual harassment contexts,87 but from the application of 
that structure, as well as evaluations of the kind of conduct necessary 
to prevail on a harassment claim. Essentially, if a judge can instruct 
a jury not to view gender harassment incidents in light of the common 
perception of sexual harassment, but rather as though the conduct was 
occurring on the basis of race, etc., the jury would be less likely to 
devalue the allegations by comparing them to sexual harassment 
incidents they have heard about.88 Likewise, plaintiffs' attorneys can 
remind judges of this dynamic when cases are being decided at a 
bench trial or on a motion. By altering the context in which the 
discriminates on the basis of sex"). 
86. This is evidenced by the types of allegations often involved in gender, and other 
non-sexual, harassment claims. See, e,g., Bell v. Crackin Good Bakers, Inc., 777 F.2d 1497, 
1499-1500, 1502-03 (lIth Cir. 1985) (supervisor told co-employee he would get rid of 
complainant, who was female, so that a male co-employee could have the job; the 
complainant was denied a promotion which was given to a male employee; a co-employee 
overheard the supervisor say he did not want female employees; the supervisor tried to make 
it rough on the complainant so she would leave by giving her orders and then contradicting 
himself, forcing her to do multiple tasks while providing insufficient time, speaking to her 
like a child and waving her paycheck in other employees' faces); Boutros, 997 F.2d at 198 
(conduct aimed at Syrian employee included repeated statements that he should not be 
working at the Transit Authority, placing his name on a "hit list" of those whose employment 
was to be terminated, and other national origin based harassment). Of course, hurting those 
perceived as outsiders may be a goal of sexual harassment, but there are other motivations 
and goals involved, such as "sexual spillover" and other issues of sexuality that change the 
nature of the harassing conduct and reactions to it. Jenson v. Eveleth Taconite Co., 824 F. 
Supp. 847, 881 (Minn. 1993). Additionally, in many sexual harassment situations, it is likely 
that the harassers do not want the victim to leave, because that would take away the object 
of their conduct. 
87. See supra Part II. 
88. Studies show that people generally view sexually charged conduct as more severe 
then non-sexual, gender based conduct. See supra note 80 and accompanying text. 
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conduct giving rise to the claim is viewed, situations where gender 
harassment claims are unjustly minimized because of a lack of overtly 
lewd sexual behavior can be avoided. Of course, there must be a 
sound basis for contextualizing gender harassment in this way. 
Looking at cases representing the various forms of actionable 
harassment is instructive in this regard. 89 
B. Comparing Gender Harassment With Other Forms of Harassment 
Recognized Under Title VII 
In demonstrating the commonality between gender harassment and 
other forms of non-sexual harassment recognized under Title VII, it 
is helpful to compare situations which courts have found sufficient to 
maintain claims for sexual, gender, racial, religious, and national 
origin harassment. After looking at those cases, they will be 
compared with the hypotheticals set forth in Part I, and this article 
will determine whether it is more appropriate to view Ms. T's case in 
light of Ms. R's or Mr. H's. 
1. Sexual Harassment 
Sexual harassment cases often involve conduct that many people 
would find lewd or shocking. For example, in Burns v. McGregor 
Electronic Industries, Inc. ,90 the complainant, who had posed nude 
in a magazine, was subjected to lewd comments by a manager-trainee 
from the beginning of her employment, including comments implying 
she had been masturbating in the bathroom, did not douche, and was 
having an affair with the owner of the company. 9 I Additionally, the 
owner of the company showed her advertisements for pornographic 
movies contained in a pornographic magazine, talked about sex, asked 
her to watch pornographic movies with him, suggested she perform 
oral sex on him, asked her out on dates, asked her to pose nude for 
him, and made lewd gestures to her such as imitating masturbation. 92 
89. Of course, common sense, as well as the studies discussed note 80 supra, and 
accompanying text, provide a basis for concern if gender harassment is contextualized on a 
continuum with sexual harassment. However, the cases discussed in the following section 
help to illustrate why gender harassment should be appropriately contextualized on a 
continuum with other forms of non-sexual harassment such as "racial harassment. 
90. 955 F.2d 559 (8th CiT. 1992), rev'd, 989 F.2d 959 (8th Cir. 1993). 
91. Burns, 955 F.2d at 560. 
92. Id. at 560-61. 
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She was the subject of plant gossip, subjected to obscene comments 
by a co-worker, and asked by a supervisor to sit on the owner's lap, 
go out with him, or up to his apartment. 93 The complainant was 
forced to quit her job three times as a result of the conduct.94 The 
court remanded the case, holding that the conduct alleged could 
constitute a hostile work environment, and that the fact the complain-
ant had posed for nude pictures was not a bar to a finding that she 
found the environment to be hostile or abusive.95 
In Brooms v. Regal Tube Co. ,96 the complainant, an African-
American female, alleged racial and sexual discrimination, including 
sexual harassment by her supervisor. The allegations of sexual 
harassment included that her supervisor made numerous sexual 
propositions, remarks, and innuendos toward her, that he showed her 
a pornographic picture depicting an African-American female being 
sodomized by a white male, telling her that it demonstrated the "talent 
of black women," and that she was hired for the purpose indicated by 
the picture.97 Later he showed her a photograph depicting an 
African-American woman engaged in an act of bestiality and told her 
that it showed how "she was going to end up," and when she reached 
for the picture, he grabbed her arm and threatened to kill her if she 
moved.98 The court affirmed the district court's holding that the 
alleged conduct created a sexually hostile work environment in 
violation of Title VII.99 
One of the more vulgar examples of sexually explicit conduct in 
the workplace is provided by the allegations in Hall v. Gus Construc-
tion Co., Inc. 100 In that case, three female flag persons were ha-
rassed by co-workers while working at construction sites. 101 The 
conduct alleged included verbal abuse, such as referring to the 
complainants as "fucking flag girls," nicknaming one of the complain-
ants "herpes," writing "cavern cunt" and "blond bitch" on complain-
ants' vehicles, and asking complainants to engage in sexual inter-
93. [d. at 561. 
94. [d. at 560-63,566. The complainant returned to work the first two times she quit 
because she needed the money. [d. at 560-63. 
95. [d. at 566. 
96. 881 F.2d 412 (7th Cir. 1989). 
97. Brooms, 881 F.2d at 416-17. 
98. [d. 
99. [d. at 418-20, 427. The court also held for the complainant regarding employer 
liability for the harassment and her claim of constructive discharge. [d.. at 4'20-23, 427. 
100. 842 F.2d 1010 (8th Cir. 1988). 
101. Hall, 842 F.2d at 1010. 
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course and oral sex with them. It also included physical and visual 
abuse, such as cornering the complainants between two trucks and 
rubbing their thighs through open windows, grabbing one complain-
ant's breasts, picking that same complainant up against a truck so that 
other men could fondle her, mooning them, flashing pictures of 
couples engaged in oral sex at them, and urinating in one complain-
ant's water bottle, and in the gas tank of complainants' vehicle. 102 
The court held for the complainants, and noted that the non-sexual 
acts, such as urinating in the gas tank and water bottle, could 
contribute to the hostile work environment. 103 
2. Gender Harassment 
Compared to the allegations involved in sexual harassment cases, 
such as those discussed above, the type of conduct often alleged in 
gender harassment cases might seem mild. Many cases involving 
gender harassment also involve allegations of sexual harassment, and 
thus, it is hard to detennine what the result would have been if only 
the incidents of gender harassment were considered. 104 It is quite 
possible that without the sexual harassment allegations, the courts 
would have evaluated the severity and pervasiveness of the mys-
ogynist conduct in light of the common perception of sexual harass-
ment allegations, and found no hostile work environment existed. 
The test for mixed sexuaVgender harassment claims is addressed in 
Part III.D. 
A case providing one of the most stunning examples of pure 
gender harassment among published opinions is Delgado v. Leh-
man. 105 In Delgado, the complainant alleged that she and other 
female personnel in her office were harassed by a male supervi-
sor.106 Her allegations included the following: the supervisor 
interfered with the perfonnance of her duties because she was female 
by locking the door to his office which contained materials necessary 
to her job, by holding back mail addressed to the staff, by losing 
reports prepared by her and other female subordinates, by providing 
102. Id. at 1012. 
103. Id. at 1013-16. See also supra notes 9 and 54 and accompanying text (addressing 
the relevance of this case in the gender harassment context). 
104. See, e.g., Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469 (3d Cir. 1990); Hall, 
842 F.2d at 1010. 
105. 665 F. Supp. 460 (E.D. Va. 1987). 
106. Delgado, 665 F. Supp. at 460. 
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inadequate guidance, by subjecting her to unwarranted criticism and 
by threatening her for leaving the office. 107 Additionally, the 
supervisor directed comments and abuse at her, such as addressing her 
by "okay babe" and "listen here woman," being loud and abusive 
towards her, telling her "I'll fix you," kicking open her office door, 
physically preventing her from leaving her office, blowing cigar 
smoke in her face, harassing and criticizing other female employees, 
stating to a member of upper management that the female employees 
behave like children, referring to female employees as "dumb females 
working for him who couldn't read or write," engaging in inappropri-
ate conduct aimed at women from outside the office, and eventually 
recommending that the complainant be removed. 108 The court 
found for the complainant on her harassment claim, holding that she 
was subjected to a pattern of harassment and discrimination "directed 
at her because of her female gender," and that as a result of that 
harassment her ability to perform her job was significantly im-
paired. 109 
In Bell v. Crackin Good Bakers, Inc., 110 the plaintiff alleged a 
pattern of harassment aimed at her by her supervisor because of her 
gender. The alleged conduct included a statement by the supervisor 
to a male employee that he would get rid of the complainant, and that 
they "could make it rough enough on her for her to leave."lll In 
an attempt to make it rough on the complainant, the supervisor gave 
her orders and then contradicted himself, told her to do many things 
in an insufficient amount of time, spoke to her like she was a child, 
waved her paycheck in co-employees' faces, called her the "pimp of 
the office," and interrupted her break periods. ll2 Additionally, a co-
employee testified in a deposition that the supervisor told her that if 
it were up to him he would not have female employees in the 
complainant's department, and would have all males out there, 
because men could do a better job than women. I \3 She also testi-
fied that the supervisor constantly tried to belittle the complainant in 
front of other employees, and that he treated her differently from the 
107. ld. at 463-65. 
108. ld. 
109. ld. at 467-69. 
110. 777 F.2d 1497 (11th Cir. 1985). 
111. Bell, 717 F.2d at 1499. 
112. ld. 
113. ld. at 1500. 
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male employees he supervised. 114 The complainant was also denied 
a promotion which was given to a male employee. 1I5 The Court of 
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit recognized that the claim was not for 
sexual harassment, but for gender-based harassment, and reversed the 
trial court's order granting summary judgment to the defendants since 
the evidence alleged was sufficient to overcome a motion for 
summary judgment. 116 
In McKinney v. Do/e,1I7 the court found that it was improper to 
grant summary judgment for the defendants when the complainant's 
primary allegation of harassment was a non-sexual physical assault by 
a male supervisor. The court held instead that non-sexual gender-
based conduct, if sufficiently "patterned or pervasive," can be action-
able under Title VII.118 The case also involved allegations of sexual 
conduct, but the alleged assault was the allegation upon which the 
parties focused. 119 Significantly, in a footnote, the court acknowl-
edged the difficulty in proving the severity or pervasiveness of the 
type of gender-based harassment alleged in that case, as compared to 
sexual harassment: 
It is true that proving that a pattern of physical force is illegally discrimi-
natory might be significantly more difficult than proving that a pattern of 
explicitly sexual advances is illegally discriminatory because the latter are 
more obviously caused by the sex of the employee. That, however, is 
simply an evidentiary problem going to one factual component of 
discrimination. 120 
By appropriately contextualizing gender harassment claims, this article 
attempts to clarify this "evidentiary problem" in light of the substan-
tive law applied to gender harassment claims. As the psychological 
studies discussed above demonstrate, the fact that appellate courts 
have recognized the actionability of gender harassment claims, does 
not preclude such claims from being minimized by a trier of fact. 121 
ll4. Id. 
115. Id. at 1499-1500. 
ll6. Id. at 1502-03. 
ll7. 765 F.2d ll29 (D.C. Cir. 1985). 
ll8. McKinney, 765 F.2d at 1137-38. 
119. Id. at 1132, 1136-37. 
120. Id. at 1139 n.21. 
121. See supra note 80 and accompanying text. 
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3. Racial/Religious/National Origin Harassment 
Racial, religious, and national origin based harassment, like gender 
harassment, often involves allegations that an employee or employees 
were tormented because of membership in a protected class. This is 
demonstrated by the parallels between the gender harassment cases 
cited above,122 and cases involving allegations of racial, religious, 
or national origin harassment as set forth below. 
In Boutros v. Canton Regional Transit Authority,123 a Syrian 
immigrant alleged that he was harassed based on his national origin 
while working as a bus driver for the transit authority. He alleged 
that the Director of Transportation, and later that director's replace-
ment, made ethnic slurs when referring to him such as, "camel 
jockey," "rug peddler," and "heeb."124 The first Director also made 
remarks directly to him, such as, 
where you come from ... you are a rich Arab. You own a restaurant and 
all sort of things and you don't need R T A and you should go back to Syria 
and fight the Israel Army and kill the Jews, ... where you came from, you 
have no vehicles, you don't know what a bus is, and you don't know what 
cars are. 125 
The replacement director put the complainant's name on a "hit list" 
of individuals he wanted terminated from employment, and told 
another employee "we are going to get rid of that camel jockey."126 
Additionally, Mr. Boutros was sometimes instructed to depart from 
standard procedures, and was then disciplined for following the 
instructions. 127 The court of appeals reversed a district court order 
dismissing the claim, noting that the alleged conduct was sufficient to 
support a claim of harassment based on national origin. 128 
In Daniels v. Essex Group, Inc., 129 the claimant alleged that he 
was racially harassed by co-workers, and that management did 
nothing to stop the harassment. Mr. Daniels was nicknamed "Buck-
wheat," subjected to jokes about his race, and teased if he spoke with 
122. See supra Part III.B.2. 
123. 997 F.2d 198 (6th Cir. 1993). 
124. Boutros, 997 F.2d at 201. 
125. Id. 
126. Id. 
127. Id. 
128. Id. at 202-04. 
129. 937 F.2d 1264 (7th Cir. 1991). 
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a white woman. 130 After several years of such treatment, the 
harassment intensified. A dummy with a black head and fake blood 
dripping was hung from a doorway, graffiti was written in the 
bathroom in his department saying, "KKK," and "niggers must die," 
and messages directly aimed at him, such as "Hi Bob KKK," were 
written on the walls of a toolhouse. l3l A co-worker repeatedly 
called him "nigger" and threatened to whip him or hurt his son. 132 
Additionally, a bullet was fired at a wall in his house, although he 
could not prove that it was fired by an Essex Group employee. 133 
Mr. Daniels finally resigned because of the conduct. 134 The court 
of appeals upheld the district court's award in favor of Mr. Daniels 
on his racially hostile work environment claim. 135 
In Turner v. Barr,136 a white Jewish Deputy United States 
Marshall sued the United States Marshall Service alleging a hostile 
work environment based on religion and race. The court found that 
Mr. Turner was subjected to a harsh comment relating to the 
Holocaust by a supervisor, who said that the cost of Germany's 
reconstruction after World War II was high because of its high gas 
bill during the war.137 Additionally, he faced other religiously and 
racially motivated conduct. When he tried to collect money for a 
charity drive, he was subjected to comments implying it was not 
appropriate for him to collect money because Jews could not be 
trusted to deal with money. Furthermore, he was told by a co-worker 
while on assignment at a jewelry store, that he should be running the 
store, implying that selling jewelry was a Jewish occupation. He was 
also inappropriately disciplined for an incident after an inadequate 
investigation. 138 
Additionally, he was denied the opportunity to work as much 
overtime as other deputies who were not white or Jewish, was forced, 
along with the other white deputies, to sit in the back of the squad 
room in an area referred to by the African-American deputies as 
"Georgetown," and when he sat at another desk was instructed to "get 
130. Danie/s, 937 F.2d at 1266. 
131. [d. 
132. !d. at 1267. 
133. [d. 
134. [d. 
135. [d. at 1268-76. 
136. 81l F. Supp. I (D.D.C. 1993). 
137. Turner, 811 F. Supp. at 3. 
138. [d. at 4-5. 
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back to Georgetown.,,139 White deputies were referred to as "white 
boys" and "white asses," Mr. Turner was told by an African-American 
deputy that he "should get his white ass out of the office because this 
is a black office, for blacks, supervised by blacks," he was given the 
nickname "turnkey" despite his objections, and a poster with his 
picture superimposed next to a set of keys and the word "turnkey" 
was hung in the office. 140 The court found that the allegations were 
sufficient to support Mr. Turner's claim based on religious and racial 
harassment. 141 
4. Conclusions Derived From the Comparison of Sexual, 
Gender, Racial, Religious, and National Origin Harassment 
By comparing the cases described above, one can see the 
similarity in the types of conduct alleged in gender, racial, religious, 
and national origin harassment. The conduct is not based on any 
attraction or sexual need, but rather upon hatred or disapproval of an . 
individual or individuals because of membership in a protected class. 
Conversely, sexual harassment is not aimed at an employee or 
employees based solely on their membership in a protected class, 
although the conduct underlying the harassment would not occur were 
the employee or employees not of a particular sex. 142 Rather, 
sexual harassment is based on the harasser's sexual needs and 
perceptions, a specific set of sex stereotypes which define the 
harasser's perceptions of the relationships between the harasser and 
the victim, and between the sexes in general. 143 Even in the sever-
est sexual harassment case, the harasser need not express misogynist 
or misandrynist attitudes. 144 
139. Id. at 4. 
140. Id. 
141. Id. at 5. 
142. Justice Ginsburg succinctiy addressed this point in her concurring opinion in 
Harris where she stated, "[t]he critical issue, Title VII's text indicates, is whether members 
of one sex are exposed to disadvantageous terms or conditions of employment to which 
members of the others sex are not exposed." Harris, 114 S. Ct. at 372 (Ginsburg, J., 
concurring) (citation omitted). 
143. See supra notes 11-13. All discrimination and harassment is based to some extent 
on power roles, hatred and stereotypes; however, it is the infusion of sexuality and sexual 
stereotypes, which are not based solely on the victim's membership in a protected class, but 
also on perceptions of human sexual interaction, which distinguish sexual harassment from 
other forms of harassment and discrimination. See supra note 13. 
144. See Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d &72 (9th Cir. 1991) (where harassment was based 
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C. Analyzing Some Hypothetical Hostile Work Environment Claims: 
The Cases of Ms. R, Ms. T, and Mr. H 
Now that gender harassment has been considered in light of the 
other types of harassment recognized under Title VII, the claims 
raised by the hypotheticals set forth in Part I can appropriately be 
addressed. When this is done, it becomes apparent that gender 
harassment claims must be analyzed in the same way as other non-
sexual harassment claims in order to fulfill Title VII's mandate 
against discrimination in the terms and conditions of employment. In 
reaching this conclusion and analyzing the hypotheticals, several 
questions present themselves: (1) what type of harassment does each 
hypothetical represent?; (2) should any of the hypotheticals be 
analyzed in relation to each other?; (3) what is the likely result of 
analyzing Ms. T's claim in light of Ms. R's?; and (4) Mr. H's? 
The first question is the easiest to answer. Ms. R's claim would 
be for sexual harassment because the conduct alleged was of an 
overtly sexual nature. Ms. T's claim would be for gender harassment 
since the incidents she complains of were aimed at her because she is 
a woman and the totality of her allegations demonstrate that the 
conduct she faced was based on a negative perception of women in 
the workplace, and not an attempt to bring sexuality or sexual conduct 
into the workplace. Mr. H's claim, which was based on conduct 
aimed at him because he is an African-American, is for racial 
harassment. 
The second question is harder to answer. In a sense, all of the 
hypotheticals can be analyzed in relation to each other because the 
structure for the hostile work environment cause of action is roughly 
the same for sexual, gender, and racial harassment. 145 However, 
when applying that structure to the pattern of conduct underlying 
those claims, it becomes apparent that Ms. T's claim is similar to Mr. 
H's claim. The severity and pervasiveness of the conduct alleged is 
similar; each alleges insults based on stereotypes of the proper work 
roles for individuals in their respective classes, conduct which 
interferes with their job functions, and an attitude that they have no 
place in a "male" or "white" workplace. 
Ms. R's claim, on the other hand, involves overtly sexual conduct 
such as touching of private parts, sexual propositions, and references 
solely on conduct related to the harasser's attraction towards the victim and not on a 
generally negative attitude about women). 
145. See supra Part II. 
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to sexual acts. The goal of the conduct is not simply to send a 
message that women do not belong in the workplace, despite the fact 
that the male co-workers seem to view Ms. R as a sex object because 
other women in the office are not treated in the same way. In fact, 
if Ms. R left the workplace, it would appear that the male employees 
would not be happy because they get some kind of pleasure out of 
subjecting her to the conduct. Thus, it would be inappropriate to 
analyze the facts underlying Ms. T's and Mr. H's claims on a 
continuum with Ms. R's because the conduct is of a different nature. 
In this regard, the answers to the third and fourth questions are 
instructive. If Ms. T's gender harassment claim is viewed in light of 
Ms. R's sexual harassment claim, it is quite possible that the trier of 
fact will determine that an objectively reasonable person/woman 
would not feel that the conduct Ms. T alleged is sufficiently severe or 
pervasive to alter a term or condition of employment and create an 
abusive working environment because Ms. T was not subject to sexual 
touchings or vulgar and shocking language. That concern is bolstered 
by the psychological data demonstrating that people evaluating sexual 
conduct along with non-sexual gender-based conduct view the overtly 
sexual conduct as substantially more severe. 146 Considering the 
major attention sexual harassment has received in the media and the 
resulting common perceptions of the nature of such harassment, 
judges and juries might intentionally or unintentionally compare the 
severity of gender-based conduct to the common perceptions of sexual 
harassment, and conclude that gender-based conduct is not sufficiently 
severe to create a hostile work environment. 
Therefore, comparing Ms. T's claim to Ms. R's would not serve 
the purposes of Title VII. Title VII mandates that conduct which 
would not have occurred but for the victim's sex is actionable if it 
alters a term or condition of employment. 147 Title VII's require-
ments do not apply only to overtly sexual harassment that is shocking 
or lewd, but rather to any conduct that alters a term or condition of 
employment based on an individual's sex. 148 In Harris, the Su-
preme Court instructs that even in the absence of tangible effects on 
job performance or benefits, "the very fact that the discriminatory 
conduct was so severe or pervasive that it created a work environment 
abusive to employees because of their race, gender, religion, or 
146. See supra note 80. 
147. See, e.g., McKinney, 765 F.2d at 1138; Campbell, 770 F. Supp. at 1485-86; 
Delgado, 665 F. Supp. at 460. 
148. Harris, 114 S. Ct. at 370-71; McKinney, 765 F.2d at 1137-40. 
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national origin offends Title VII's broad rule of workplace equali-
ty.,,149 There is little question that the psychological result of 
gender-based harassment can be devastating, 150 and can create an 
abusive working environment. 
The story is quite different if gender harassment claims were 
analyzed like racial, religious, and national origin harassment claims. 
For example., Mr. H's claim is similar to the non-sexual harassment 
cases set forth above, lSI and thus he would probably prevail. If the 
severity and pervasiveness of Ms. T's allegations were analyzed in 
light of Mr. H's, using the same criterion, she too would likely 
prevail. Both claims involve remarks and conduct aimed at the 
victims because of their membership in a protected class, and triers 
of fact have found such claims to be objectively reasonable. 152 
Significantly, this is not a proposal that a judge or jury must compare 
gender harassment allegations with racial harassment allegations, but . 
rather that they view the severity and pervasiveness of the misogynist 
or misandrynist conduct as determined by the objective and subjective 
reasonableness standards in the same way they would view racist 
conduct. Further, gender-based conduct should not be compared to 
that alleged in sexual harassment cases in determining the severity and 
pervasiveness of the conduct. Juries should be appropriately 
instructed, and judges reminded, of this in gender harassment cases. 
D. Mixed Gender/Sexual Harassment Claims 
It is not uncommon for a hostile work environment claim to 
involve allegations of both overtly sexual conduct and non-sexual 
gender-based harassment. 153 Fortunately, guidance on how to deal 
149. Harris, 114 S. Ct. at 371. 
150. 'See Louise F. Fitzgerald, Sexual Harassment: Violence Against Women in the 
Workplace, 48 AM. PSYCHOL. 1070,1072 (Oct. 1993) (discussing the consequences of sexual 
harassment); See also Levy, supra note 13, at 42-49 (describing some of the psychological 
impact of gender based harassment). 
151. See supra Part III.B.3. 
152. See supra Parts II, IILB.2., and 3. 
153. See, e.g., Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469 (3d CiT. 1990) 
(allegations included pornography, displaying of sexual objects on desks, use of obscene 
language towards female officers, name calling, taking female officers' files and work 
product, destruction of property, anonymous phone calls and the placement of a lime 
substance in a female officer's clothing); McKinney v. Dole, 765 F.2d 1129 (D.C. CiT. 1985) 
(allegations included a non-sexual physical assault on a female employee, a supervisor 
exposing himself to her, rubbing up against her and asking her for sexual favors in addition 
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with such claims is provided by the courts which have addressed 
mixed gender/sexual harassment or mixed racial/sexual harassment 
claims. Those courts have looked to the totality of the conduct 
alleged, and asked whether it rises to the level necessary to create a 
hostile work environment. 154 In so doing, the courts have found 
work environments to be hostile based on the combination of 
protected characteristics at which the conduct was aimed. 155 Thus, 
when allegations of both sexual and gender harassment are alleged, 
the trier of fact should determine if the totality of the conduct alleged 
was sufficiently severe or pervasive to support a hostile work 
environment claim based on gender, sexually charged conduct, or 
both. In making this determination, the allegations of gender 
harassment should not be minimized, even if they are not as shocking 
or vulgar as the sexual harassment allegations. 
CONCLUSION 
As the field of employment discrimination law evolves, we will . 
consistently be faced with new concepts, arguments, and theories. It 
is essential to define the law in this area as precisely as possible given 
to other verbal abuse. However, because of the timing of the other incidents, the assault was 
the primary incident the court considered in evaluating her harassment claim). 
held: 
154. In Hicks v. Gates Rubb~r Co., 833 F.2d 1406, 1416 (10th Cir. 1987), the court 
The third question is whether, in determining the pervasiveness of the harassment 
against a plaintiff, a trial court may aggregate evidence of racial hostility with 
evidence of sexual hostility. We conclude that such aggregation is permissi-
ble .... Title VII prohibits an employer from discriminating against any individual 
because of race or because of sex. The use of the word 'or' evidences Congress' 
intent to prohibit employment discrimination based on any or al\ of the listed 
characteristics. 
Hicks, 833 F.2d at 1416. 
Likewise, in Andrews, the court addressed the issue of how mixed gender/sexual 
harassment al\egations should be evaluated, holding: 
[T]he trial judge should look at al\ of the incidents to see if they produce a work 
environment hostile and offensive to women of reasonable sensibilities. The 
evidence in this case includes not only name calling, pornography, displaying 
sexual objects on desks, but also the recurrent disappearances of plaintiffs' case 
files and work product, anonymous phone cal\s, and destruction of other property. 
The court should view this evidence in its totality, as described above, and then 
reach a determination. 
Andrews, 895 F.2d at 1486. 
ISS. Id. See also Turner v. Barr, 811 F. Supp. I (D.D.C. 1993) (recognizing the 
actionability of conduct aimed at an employee because of his religion and race). 
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its complexity and the wide variety of situations to which it applies. 
The reason for this is simp)e: employees and employers need to 
understand their rights and duties so that employees do not feel that 
they have to put up with discriminatory conduct, and employers can 
take actions to prevent discrimination and the liability and economic 
losses associated with it. 
One emerging employment discrimination theory is the concept of 
gender harassment. It has already been recognized by the EEOC and 
some courts, but its nature and structure require in depth exploration. 
Unfortunately, because of the pervasiveness of sexual harassment in 
the courts and the media, gender harassment might not receive the 
treatment it should from judges and juries, despite the fact that it can 
cause great harm to its victims. This article has addressed this 
growing legal theory, by assessing its nature and structure, comparing 
it to other forms of harassment actionable under Title VII, and 
addressing the importance of analyzing gender harassment claims in 
the appropriate context. 
By providing an analytical framework now, while the concept of 
gender harassment is in the early stages of evolution, a clarification 
of some of the issues raised by such claims will hopefully result. 
Only by exposing and discussing such concerns can a useful body of 
law be provided for employers and employees to use. Hopefully, that 
body of law will contribute to the eradication of discrimination in the 
workplace. 
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